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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, MANAGERS’ INDEPENDENCE, EXPORTING 
AND PERFORMANCE OF FIRMS IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 
 
 
[Abstract] 
 
Using data on 157 large companies in Poland and Hungary this paper employs Bayesian 
structural equation modeling to examine interrelationships between corporate 
governance, managers’ independence from owners in terms of strategic decision-making, 
exporting and performance. It is found that managers’ independence is positively 
associated with firms’ financial performance and exporting. In turn, the extent of 
managers’ independence is contingent on the firm’s corporate governance parameters: it 
is negatively associated with ownership concentration, but positively associated with the 
percentage of foreign directors on the firm’s board. We interpret these results as an 
indication that (i) risk averse, concentrated owners tend to constrain managerial 
autonomy at the cost of the firm’s internationalization and performance, (ii) board 
participation of foreign stakeholders, on the other hand, enhances the firm’s export 
orientation and performance by encouraging executives’ decision-making autonomy.  
 
Key words: corporate governance, strategic independence, exporting, performance  
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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, MANAGERS’ INDEPENDENCE, EXPORTING 
AND PERFORMANCE OF FIRMS IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 
 
1. Introduction 
Economic reforms and globalization of firms in transition economies have 
dramatically changed the boundaries and content of governance and strategy of firms, 
exposing them to multipoint competitive pressures. Managers of these firms have to make 
strategic decisions in a complex decision-making environment (Sanders and Carpenter, 
1998), and one should expect that the performance of large firms may be closely linked 
with managerial flexibility in making strategic decisions within the context of the firm’s 
governance. Yet this issue remains relatively unexplored. Emphasis on organizational and 
environmental factors as antecedents of both financial performance and export 
performance ignores possible organizational effects of managers’ strategic independence, 
defined as their ability to provide timely and effective strategic responses in a rapidly 
changing environment (Harrigan, 1985, Mahoney, 1995), especially without being 
constrained by new owners of formerly state-controlled firms (Newman, 2000). In addition, 
little is known about the impact of emerging corporate governance mechanisms on 
managerial strategic independence, although previous research suggests that this may be 
an important antecedent of managerial ability to undertake performance-enhancing 
strategies (Hoskisson et al., 2000). 
This study explores the links between corporate governance, managers’ strategic 
independence, exporting and financial performance of large firms in two economically 
important transition countries: Poland and Hungary. Before their economic reforms, 
 4
exporting remained a monopoly controlled by  a handful of specialized state-owned 
companies. In a liberalized economic environment, with sluggish internal demand, 
adopting export-oriented strategies may be closely link to better financial performance 
(Luo and Peng, 1999). In this environment, how do private enterprises develop 
exporting? We address this broad question by examining three specific issues. First, how 
does the new freedom for management to exercise strategic choice affect export 
orientation (approximated by both level and change in exports as a proportion of total 
sales)? Second, what are the possible links between these factors and financial 
performance? And finally, how is managerial independence (in terms of strategic 
decisions) affected by the corporate governance characteristics of firms in transition 
countries?  
Our study develops existing research and makes a number of contributions. We 
provide a new framework modelling the linkages between managers’ strategic 
independence, governance factors, exporting and financial performance. Research in this 
area has been thin and a major barrier has been the complexity of interdependence 
between governance, strategies and performance. While previous research has linked 
strategies with performance (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Makhija, 2004), and governance 
directly with performance (Djankov and Murrell, 2002; Peng, 2004), this paper takes the 
full governance-strategy-performance paradigm and makes a novel contribution by 
applying Bayesian-based structural equation modeling (SEM) to the inter-relationships 
between governance factors, managers’ independence, exporting strategy and financial 
performance. To verify our theoretical assumptions, we use a multi-industry sample of 
157 large, private, non-financial firms in two new EU member-states. 
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2. Theoretical framework and research hypotheses 
Economic reforms in Central and East Europe (CEE) aimed at increasing 
enterprise efficiency and making their products internationally competitive. Reforms 
were accompanied by a structural crisis, exacerbated by the collapse of the East European 
trading bloc and the break-up of the USSR (Uhlenbruck et al., 2003). Prolonged import 
protection and export promotion through monopolistic, state-owned foreign trade 
companies meant enterprises were ill-equipped to meet overseas threats and had different 
opportunities for internationalization.  
Privatization was designed to eliminate the constraints on the managerial 
independent decision-making process imposed by state ownership (Hoskisson et al., 
2000; Makhija, 2004). In the case of Hungary and Poland, companies were privatized 
using a wide range of methods, with a significant participation of strategic investors, 
including multinationals (Djankov and Murrell, 2002). These privatizations resulted in a 
diverse range of ownership structures and corporate governance mechanisms (Newman, 
2000). It has been acknowledged in previous research that corporate governance affects 
enterprises restructuring and financial performance (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Peng, 2004), 
however the effects of governance on exporting are less clear. Therefore, transition 
economies are a natural context in which to test theories concerning the first stage of 
internationalization, i.e. direct exporting (Andersen, 1993; Aulakh et al., 2000). 
Our study is based on the governance-conduct-performance paradigm in strategic 
management, with export intensity and financial performance being the outcome of a 
multi-dimensional strategic decision-making process. This process is driven by the firm’s 
managers’ strategic independence, which is defined as “an ability to respond to various 
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demands from dynamic competitive environments” (Sanchez, 1995, p. 138). When 
managers are not constrained by new owners in terms of their strategic decisions, they are 
able to take timely actions aimed at improving the firm’s competitive position in domestic 
markets and promoting overseas outputs (Aulakh et al., 2000). By being involved in 
international activities, firms in transition economies may further develop their 
capabilities (Sanders and Carpenter, 1998), and this suggests a positive relationship 
between exporting and financial performance (Luo and Peng, 1999).  
Although performance and export orientation in particular may be increased by 
higher degrees of managerial decision-making autonomy; the latter, in turn, depends on 
the firm’s governance factors such as ownership structure and board composition 
(Uhlenbruck et al., 2003; Hoskisson et al., 2000). Therefore, our framework suggests that 
the complex relationships between governance, exporting and financial performance are 
mediated by managers’ strategic independence. The following sections discuss these 
issues in detail. 
 
2.1. Managers’ strategic independence, export orientation and performance 
Institutional and economic reforms associated with the EU accession process and 
internationalization of transition economies, such as Poland and Hungary, imposed new 
demands on local firms to develop the dynamic capabilities that enable them to take 
advantage of new opportunities, including gaining access to new product markets 
(Hoskisson et al., 2000; Newman, 2000). Uhlenbruck et al. (2003) strongly emphasize 
that the continuously changing market conditions in transition economies require the 
development of “strategic flexibility” that should help firms to take advantage of 
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existing and new strategic opportunities.  Strategic flexibility depends jointly on the 
inherent flexibility of resources available to the organization (Finney et al., 2005) and on 
managers’ “flexibility in coordinating the use of resources” (Sanchez, 1995, p. 138).  
The importance of “resource flexibility” has been acknowledged in previous 
research (Harrigan, 1980; Mahoney, 1995). For example, the resource-based view 
considers the organization’s capacity to change as a function of such firm characteristics 
as capital “specificity”, “slack” resources, the firm’s diversity defined in terms of product 
diversification and/or organizational structure (Finney et al., 2005; Hitt et al., 1998). 
However, firms in transition economies inherited from their central planning past a 
bundle of resources, which are inconsistent with the requirements of effectiveness in a 
market economy (Uhlenbruck et al., 2003). Therefore, in the transition environment, 
another component of the firm’s flexibility, managerial strategic independence, or their 
ability to make bold and timely decisions over capability-enhancing strategies without 
restrictions imposed by new owners of privatized firms, may become particularly 
important. In command economies, managerial initiatives were constrained by direct 
orders from the planning bureaucracy (Kornai, 1980).  New private owners of firms in 
Poland and Hungary were expected to unlock managerial talent, but with repeated 
institutional upheavals, organizational learning was difficult, and the extent of a firm’s 
embeddedness in the old strategies could become a barrier to change (Newman, 2000). 
Peng (2004) suggests that uncertainty and institutional changes in transition lead to a 
deepening mistrust between managers and “new principals”, who may try assume full 
control over strategic decisions. To summarize, organizational outcomes of strategic 
restructuring in transition economies, such as the extent of internationalization and 
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financial performance, may be impeded not only by constraints related to organizational 
resources, but also by a lack of managerial strategic independence, or their ability to use 
wider strategic options without restrictions imposed by new owners. Hence: 
Hypothesis 1. The extent of managers’ strategic independence is positively 
associated with export orientation. 
Hypothesis 2. The extent of managers’ strategic independence is positively 
associated with financial performance. 
International business research considers exporting and financial performance as 
inter-related organizational outcomes of the firm’s strategic dynamics (Aulakh et al., 
2000).  Using sunk-cost arguments, a number of authors suggest that financially better-
performing firms in an industry are more likely to be exporters (Bernard and Jensen, 
1999; Clerides et al., 1998). There has been less research on whether there is a positive 
link back from exporting to firm performance. International business research argues that 
internationalization enables firms to leverage their existing capabilities and knowledge 
across countries and create scale economies otherwise unavailable domestically 
(Andersen, 1993). Sanders and Carpenter (1988) suggest that being exposed to overseas 
markets helps the firm respond more effectively to foreign competitors in their domestic 
market. Firms are continually searching for new technologies, new ways of organizing 
their operation, and can take advantage of new information gained by exporting to 
compete in their home market (Bernard and Jensen, 1999). Gains from export orientation 
may be particularly strong in transition economies. With initial near-autarchy and slow 
recovery, export orientation may be a key factor leading to improved financial 
performance (Luo and Peng, 1999). Hence:  
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Hypothesis 3. Export orientation is positively associated with financial 
performance. 
 
2.2. Corporate governance and managers’ strategic independence  
 Institutional upheavals and rapid change in transition economies increase the 
ambiguity surrounding managers’ actions (Newman, 2000). This creates incentives for 
outside shareholders to become directly involved in strategy shaping, as they are not able 
to observe and evaluate managers’ strategic decisions and their outcomes adequately 
(Sanders and Carpenter, 1998).  As a result, when there is an increase in information 
asymmetry between managers and owners, as implied by the economic transition in 
general, and internationalisation of the firm in particular, outside owners may limit 
managers’ “strategic freedom”. In this environment, large and undiversified shareholders 
have both the incentive and the means to restrain the strategic independence of managers 
and reduce their responsibility to purely technical tasks. Moreover, lack of developed 
capital markets in CEE, limited portfolio diversification and liquidity mean that large 
shareholders are affected adversely by the company’s idiosyncratic risks (Maug, 1998). 
Even when large investors recognise the potential upside gains associated with risky 
strategies, such as internationalization, lack of diversification opportunities and threats of 
managerial strategic errors may prompt them to impose severe restraints on managerial 
decision-making independence.  Hence, we propose: 
Hypothesis 4. The extent of managers’ strategic independence is negatively 
associated ownership concentration. 
 10
The composition of a firm’s board of directors is another governance parameter 
that can affect decision-making process, shaping the extent of managers’ strategic 
independence (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990). Strategy research particularly 
emphasizes the importance of the board’s service and strategic roles when the firm faces 
a highly uncertain environment of economic transition (Peng, 2004). For firms, which 
were until recently operating in the semi-autarchic environment, a particularly positive 
role in this respect may be played by the foreign directors, who supply critical 
information and advice otherwise unobtainable. Board members associated with foreign 
investors also improve monitoring capacity of the board that reduces information 
asymmetries between managers and new owners and mitigates moral hazard costs 
associated with managerial decision-making autonomy. Therefore, presence of foreign 
board members may bring in new organizational culture, enhancing managers’ strategic 
independence, and we suggest:  
Hypothesis 5. The extent of managers’ strategic independence is positively 
associated with the proportion of foreign directors on the firms’ board. 
 
3. Research Methods 
3.1. Sample 
Firm-level data was collected simultaneously in Poland and Hungary in 2001 
using the same structured instrument (translated and back-translated from English into 
Polish and Hungarian, correspondingly). In the course of face-to-face interviews, 
company presidents and CEOs provided information on measurable company 
characteristics, and managers’ assessment of their independence reported on a 7-point 
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Likert scale. Our surveys of Polish and Hungarian companies were conducted by the 
Research Department of the Polish Sociological Society jointly with CASE Institute 
(Warsaw), and by the Institute of Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Science 
respectively. To obtain representative samples of large companies, we defined the sample 
frame using two large company lists that are in public domain in Poland and Hungary. In 
Poland, we used a list of the 500 largest (in terms of sales) non-financial companies that 
is maintained by the Institute of Economics of the Polish Academy of Sciences and 
regularly published by the Rzeczpospolita. In Hungary, we used a list of the 250 largest 
companies available from the Figyelo magazine. These two lists were combined together, 
producing a sample frame for the survey. The average non-response rate in both countries 
was below 10%. The survey generated 100 and 57 usable questionnaires in Poland and 
Hungary respectively. We verified the representativeness of our sample using available 
comparison criteria, such as size, age, industry affiliation, etc. A standard test of non-
response bias indicated no significant differences between respondents and non-
respondents on variables such as country and industry distributions, number of 
employees, etc. Concerned with inter-rater reliability, a randomly selected 5% of 
companies were re-visited by the interviewers. No deviations between the study data and 
companies’ documents, such as payroll lists, share registers, etc. were identified. 
 
3.2. Measures and analysis 
We adopt the structural equation modeling (SEM) approach and estimate SEM 
parameters using Gibbs sampling, a simulation procedure based on the Markov chain 
Monte Carlo (MCMC) method, implemented in the Bayesian inference package 
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WinBUGS (Spiegelhalter et al., 2000). Bayesian SEM is a more robust research 
methodology because it circumvents the need to rely on asymptotic theory in the 
estimation procedures, which may be questionable when the sample size is small, and, 
therefore, inferences based on maximum likelihood estimates of SEM may be over-
confident. Another advantage of the Bayesian method is the possibility to impute missing 
values associated with non-responses to the survey questions. (For details see: Gelman et 
al., 2004; Congdon,  2003; Gilks et al., 1996).  
 In the SEM we investigated the relationships between latent (unobservable) 
constructs for managerial independence (ψi), export orientation (ηi) and operating 
performance (ξi) of a firm i. A graphical summary of the SEM is provided in Figure 1, 
where measurable indicators are in boxes and latent variables are in ovals.  
FIGURE 1 NEAR HERE 
To develop the managerial independence variable (ψi) we used eleven ordinal 
indicators of managerial independence yk generated by answers to scaled response 
questions with regard to how much independence the management team has in deciding 
on: 1) product mix; 2) selection of customers; 3) selection of suppliers; 4) investment; 5) 
research and development; 6) finances; 7) employment; 8) wages; 9) management and 
organization systems; 10) pricing policy and marketing; 11) choice of trade partners. The 
answers were provided on a 7-point Likert scale with 1 = decided by the owners (i.e. a local 
parent, foreign company, other institutional investors, etc.) and 7 = decided by the firm’s 
executive team. The latent variable for export orientation (ηi) was operationalized by 
using the proportion of export revenues to total sales for 2000 (expri) and the percentage 
change in export sales over the period 1998-2000 (expgri). The latent variable of 
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operating performance (ξi) was operationalized by earnings before taxes over assets 
(ebtassi) and earnings before taxes over sales revenue (ebtrevi) in 2000. Similar measures 
have been widely used (Djankov and Murrell, 2002). 
In terms of corporate governance characteristics, the ownership concentration 
measurement was based on information on the percentage of shares held by the largest 
shareholder. To take account of a possible non-linearity in ownership concentration 
effects, we considered four ownership intervals of less than 25%, 25-49%, 50-74% and 
75-100%. Thus, the ownership concentration was represented by a four-fold categorical 
variable (lspi) defining ownership intervals. The extent of foreign representation on the 
board was measured by the proportion of foreign directors on board (fori). To control for 
the possible effect of the identity of the largest shareholder, we also introduced a dummy 
variable for the largest shareholder being a foreign firm (finsi). 
Finally, we also considered a number of firm-, industry- and country-level factors 
that may affect performance (see Figure 1). To control for the firm’s size in terms of 
employment, we used three dummies (xi,empl,) for intervals of (250-499), (500-999) and 
(above 1000) of employees respectively. The (below 250) interval was used as a control. 
Four sector dummies (xi,sector) were used for labor-intensive (ISIC codes 15-20 and 36), 
resource-intensive (ISIC codes 21-26), high-tech (ISIC codes 28-35), services and 
construction (ISIC codes 45, 50-52, 55) industries, with firms from heavy industry (ISIC: 
<14 and 27) being used as a control. A dummy variable (xi,poland) was used for companies 
in Poland.  
The Bayesian model includes two parts: (i) a set of measurement equations that 
provide links between the manifest variables discussed above and the three latent 
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constructs, and (ii) structural equations which verify the relationships between the latent 
constructs (ψi, ηi, ξi), as well as analyze the effects of governance parameters on 
managerial independence (ψi).  We estimated the following SEM, with the following 
structural equations:  
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where βind, νind, βexp are parameters associated with interrelations between performance, 
managerial independence and export orientation; λebtrev, λebtass, λexpr, λexpgr, γk are the 
factor loadings that show how observed indicators determine scores of latent constructs; 
δlsp,δfins,δfor are parameters related to the effects of ownership and board composition on 
managerial independence; βempl, βsector, βpoland are the coefficients for the effects of control 
variables; α, ki  are the intercepts. Equations (2e) include unknown threshold parameters, 
and they specify proportional-odds models for the eleven ordinal indicators of managerial 
independence yk with observed categories jk and factor loadings γk (see Agresti, 1986, and 
Congdon, 2003). 
To ensure identifiability, we defined the three latent variables (ψi, ηi, ξi) as 
normally distributed with variances of unity. We also allowed for the monotonicity 
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constraint for thresholds θkj, and their ordering, by setting truncated standard normal prior 
distributions with zero means and large variances. Since in the Gibbs sampling context 
the predetermined variance identifiability constraint can lead to a problem of  “re-
labelling” of the latent construct scores during the sampling, we followed Congdon 
(2003) and restricted normal priors with zero means and large variances for factor 
loadings and parameters βind, βexp νind, to positive values.  
We verified the convergence of the MCMC simulation using the Gelman-Rubin 
scale reduction factor (SRF) for a two-chain run (Gelman, 1996). We also verified the 
model’s goodness-of-fit by calculating the posterior p-value (tail-area) probabilities from 
the posterior predictive replications (see Gelman, 1996, and Gelman et al., 2004, for a 
detailed discussion of the construction and computation of the Bayesian χ2 test).  The 
posterior predictive p-value based on the likelihood-ratio test statistic and 2,000 
predictive replications was equal to 0.227, confirming a good fit between our model and 
the data (Scheines et al. 1999). 
 
4. Results 
Table 1 provides the definitions of variables used in this study and the descriptive 
analysis of our data. 68 percent of companies were from the manufacturing sectors, with 
32 percent being from services and construction. The mean employment level in our 
sample was 1063, but the distributions were skewed due to the presence of a few very 
large companies, especially in the Hungarian sub-sample, where the largest company had 
15,599 employees. The distributions of two alternative measures of size, e.g., assets and 
total revenues, followed a similar pattern. Based on the full sample, the mean value of 
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total revenues was US$65.5 million while the mean book value of total assets was 
US$42.8 million. In terms of corporate governance parameters, almost half of the firms in 
Hungary and Poland had foreign owners as the largest shareholders. With regard to the 
proportion of shares held by the largest owner, our data indicates a relatively high level of 
share-ownership concentration, e.g., 62.5 percent of the total equity. Foreign directors on 
average held almost a third of board seats.  
TABLE 1 NEAR HERE 
Table 2 provides the results of SEM estimations of inter-relationships between 
governance, strategic independence and performance.  According to the results of the 
measurement models for the three latent variables, strategic independence proxies were 
within the credible intervals, and they generated a robust latent variable (ψi). Similarly, 
the export performance and financial performance proxies were also within credible 
intervals, and they generated the corresponding latent variables (ηi, and ξi). 
TABLE 2 NEAR HERE 
SEM results generally supported our hypotheses with regard to the inter-
relationships between managers’ strategic independence, export- and financial- 
performance. In particular, the strategic independence construct was positively associated 
with export orientation (the coefficient νind) and financial performance (the coefficient 
βind). These results support hypotheses 1 and 2. In addition, export orientation was 
positively associated with the latent variable for financial performance (the coefficient 
βexp), and this confirms hypothesis 3. Finally, in terms of the controls, Polish firms 
significantly under performed their Hungarian counterparts, as indicated by the 
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coefficient (βpoland). The firm’s size and sector affiliation did not have any effects on 
performance. 
In terms of corporate governance effects on strategic independence, the SEM 
results for ownership concentration suggested that there was a negative effect of block-
holders on strategic flexibility, but it was significant only at very high levels of 
concentration: the coefficients (δlsp) were negative and within the confidence interval for 
(50-74%) and (75-100%) ownership ranges, i.e., the levels of ownership that are above 
the controlling stake, in line with hypothesis 4. The coefficient for the proportion of 
foreigners on board (δfor) was within the confidence intervals, and it was positively 
associated with the strategic independence construct, in line with hypothesis 5. In 
addition, the SEM results provided evidence of a negative but insignificant relationship 
between the strategic independence construct and the dummy variable for the foreign 
largest shareholder (δfins). 
 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
Our study is one of the first examining simultaneous links between corporate 
governance, managerial independence, exporting and financial performance. This paper 
helps to fill gaps in relation to multi-industry samples of larger newly-privatized 
manufacturing firms in the transition context. It shows that managerial independence in 
terms of strategic decision-making may play crucial role as a driver of 
internationalization and performance. The extent of managerial independence is 
determined by the general governance factors, such as ownership and board structures. 
High ownership concentration in transitional economies was investors’ response to low 
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levels of protection of minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 1997). However, the 
strategy-level outcomes of this concentration are restrictions on managerial independence 
that may have negative effects on the local firm’s internationalization and performance. 
Although we focus specifically on Poland and Hungary, variations in governance regimes 
(La Porta et al., 1997) suggest scope for international analyses of the links between 
governance, strategic independence and performance.  
The contrasting effects of ownership concentration/board representation on 
export- and performance-enhancing strategic independence of managers may have 
important implications for both the strategy and the exporting literature. Our research 
suggests that foreign investors’ board involvement is playing a relatively more important 
strategic role than the size of their equity stakes in local firms. This finding is consistent 
with resource and strategy views on corporate governance that suggest that, in addition to 
control functions, external board members may also play service/resource roles in the 
decision-making process (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990), especially when the firm 
faces a highly uncertain environment of institutional transition (Peng, 2004).  Our 
evidence suggests that in transition economies foreign board members may have a 
positive impact on the extent of managerial independence, which, in turn, underpins 
exporting and performance. 
In addition, we have found evidence of a significant, positive link between 
exporting and financial performance in the two transition economies. Exporting, 
however, is the first stage in the firm’s internationalization path (Bernard and Jensen, 
1999). As the integration of Poland and Hungary into the EU proceeds, performance 
differences between exporting and non-exporting firms may affect their subsequent 
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internationalization decision. The longer-term analysis of their strategic dynamics may 
shed new light on the complex inter-relationships between corporate governance, 
business strategy and performance. 
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Figure 1. Structural Equation Model 
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Table 1. Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev.
Performance 
ebtrev Earnings before taxes over sales, %  2.16 8.83 
ebtass Earnings before taxes over assets, %  0.022 0.17 
Export orientation 
expr Export revenue as % of total sales 0.25 0.28 
expgr Change in export sales over 1998-2000, % 1.93 10.41 
Managers’ independence factors 
y1 product mix 5.54 1.89 
y2 selection of customers 5.52 1.67 
y3 selection of suppliers 4.77 2.16 
y4 investment 4.54 2.10 
y5 research and development 4.77 2.11 
y6 finances 5.42 1.72 
y7 employment issues 5.65 1.72 
y8 wages 5.58 1.70 
y9 management and organization  5.42 1.97 
y10 price policy and marketing 5.52 1.86 
y11 choice of trade partners 4.94 2.18 
Corporate governance 
lsp Proportion of shares held by the largest shareholder, %  62.46 32.60 
for Proportion of foreign investors’ representatives on board, % 31.12 36.41 
Control variables 
xpoland Dummy variable for Polish firms 0.64  
xlab Labor intensive industry (ISIC: 15-20 and 36) 0.36 0.48 
xres Resource intensive industry (ISIC: 21-26) 0.21 0.41 
xtech Medium and high technology industry (ISIC: 28-35) 0.06 0.22 
xser Services and construction (ISIC: 45, 50-52, >55) 0.34 0.47 
xempl Number of employees 1063 1771 
fins Largest shareholder is a foreign investor, a dummy variable 0.46 0.50 
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Table 2. Structural Equation Modeling Results  
 
  Credible interval 
 Mean 2.50% 97.50% 
Measurement models; indicator-factor loadings 
Performance   
    λebtass 0.023 0.018 0.033 
    λebtrev 0.020 0.015 0.029 
Export orientation   
   λexpgr  0.098 0.004 0.258 
    λexpr 0.074 0.002 0.223 
Managerial independence   
γ1 1.991 1.469 2.588 
γ2 2.484 1.901 3.178 
γ3 1.795 1.352 2.309 
γ4 1.716 1.300 2.190 
γ5 2.006 1.528 2.560 
γ6 1.491 1.107 1.932 
γ7 1.677 1.245 2.183 
γ8 1.633 1.200 2.125 
γ9 2.283 1.713 2.937 
γ10 3.009 2.283 3.896 
γ11 1.326 0.959 1.732 
Hypothesized relationships and controls 
Performance, independence and exporting   
  βexp 43.220 28.370 53.510 
  βind 2.191 0.067 6.738 
  νind 0.069 0.003 0.189 
Ownership concentration1    
  δlsp[2] 25-49% -0.406 -1.130 0.316 
  δlsp[3] 50-74% -0.990 -1.687 -0.277 
  δlsp[4] 75-100% -0.900 -1.613 -0.181 
Proportion of foreign directors on board  δfor 0.058 0.033 0.090 
Employment size2   
   βempl [2: 250-499 employees]  -4.265 -29.240 16.870 
   βempl [3: 500-999 employees] 4.133 -19.680 23.630 
   βempl [4: 1000 and more] -10.110 -36.480 12.850 
Poland dummy  βpoland  -36.570 -56.020 -18.780 
Largest shareholder’s identity δfins -0.559 -1.045 -0.060 
 
NOTES: Highlighted coefficients (in bold) suggest the 5% level of significance. Sectoral 
dummies (all insignificant) and the intercepts are not included in the table. 
1. Coefficients for ownership concentration are contrasts with a group where the largest 
shareholder owns 24% of shares and less.  
2. Coefficients are contrasts with a group of firms with 250 employees and less. 
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